The 5 Worst Black Friday Cyberattacks on Ecommerce Websites
TL;DR
- The five worst Black Friday cyberattacks on ecommerce websites, ranked: SessionReaper (2025), CosmicSting (2024), TrojanOrder (2022), the Shopify app checkout hijack (2026) and the ZAGG FreshClick checkout skimmer (2024).
- The top entry: SessionReaper was exploited six weeks after Adobe’s fix, when 62% of Magento stores were still unpatched, and CISA listed it as known-exploited two days after the first attacks.
- This season has already started: in September and October 2026, a Magento zero-day (StyleSmuggler), three hijacked Shopify apps and a skimmer on Brazil’s Convertr platform hit online stores.
- The weaknesses were ordinary: fixes left uninstalled (62% of stores were still unpatched six weeks after SessionReaper’s), injection through order data, and checkout apps and platform environments that nobody watched at runtime.
- The defense: run agentic web pentesting on your checkout, login and APIs before the code freeze and on every release after it, monitor what scripts do on payment pages, and don’t wait for someone else to tell you.
Definition
What is a Black Friday attack?
A Black Friday attack is a web attack on an online store, aimed at the platform, the checkout or the third-party code on it, that runs in the weeks around the holiday shopping peak. It usually ends the same way: a skimmer on the payment page, a backdoor on the server or a hijacked customer account.
The five at a glance
We ranked these five by what they exposed. Each is a web attack on the store itself that ran in the run-up to Black Friday and Cyber Monday or in the holiday window, between 2022 and 2026. We left out phishing, ransomware and anything else that doesn’t go through the storefront. None of the five is documented hitting on Black Friday itself. They ran in the weeks before it, when an attacker wants a skimmer already working.
| # | Attack | Year | The number |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SessionReaper | 2025 | 62% of stores still unpatched when attacks began |
| 2 | CosmicSting | 2024 | 4,275 stores with a checkout skimmer, 5% of all |
| 3 | TrojanOrder | 2022 | About 38% of Magento and Adobe Commerce sites targeted in November |
| 4 | Shopify app checkout hijack | 2026 | Three apps sent shoppers to fake checkouts over 8 days, October 10 to 18 |
| 5 | ZAGG FreshClick | 2024 | 13 days of checkout card theft, October 26 to November 7 |
Fall 2026
Already this season
- September: StyleSmuggler. Attackers exploited a CVSS 10 Magento and Adobe Commerce flaw from September 4, three days before Adobe had a fix, and planted backdoors, a web shell and a card skimmer. Read our breakdown
- October: hijacked Shopify apps. Three apps sent shoppers to fake checkout pages for eight days. It is #4 on this list.
- October: Convertr. Attackers altered the analytics script on a Brazilian platform that runs checkouts for dozens of fashion brands. The skimmer took card numbers, CVVs and CPF tax IDs from every merchant’s checkout until it was removed on October 27.
Black Friday 2026 is November 27.
5. The ZAGG FreshClick Checkout Skimmer (October to November 2024)
Date: October 26 to November 7, 2024; discovered November 8
Vector: Malicious code injected into FreshClick, a third-party app running on ZAGG’s BigCommerce checkout
Impact: Names, addresses and payment card data entered at ZAGG.com checkout during the window; the number of affected customers wasn’t disclosed
This is the quietest entry on the list, and the one that looks most like how stores are built today.
For 13 days heading into Black Friday 2024, shoppers who paid on ZAGG.com may have handed their card details to an attacker. ZAGG told customers that an unknown actor injected malicious code into FreshClick, an app offered through its e-commerce platform, BigCommerce. The code was designed to scrape names, addresses and card data as shoppers checked out. BigCommerce told ZAGG about the compromise on November 8.
BigCommerce said its own systems weren’t breached, and it removed the app from merchants’ stores once it found the compromise. ZAGG offered affected customers identity protection services. How the attacker got into FreshClick hasn’t been published.
The lesson is that a hosted platform doesn’t put checkout scripts out of scope. Hosted describes the platform, not the apps running on your checkout: the platform was fine here, and the checkout still leaked cards. Every app on a payment page runs with the same access as your own code, and its publisher can change it at any time.
The only way to catch that moment is to watch what each script on the payment page does, not where it came from. That is what Reflectiz does from the outside: it inventories every script on your payment pages, including ones delivered through platform apps, and flags changes in what they do, the control PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 require.
Related: Why Unmonitored JavaScript Is Your Biggest Holiday Security Risk
4. The Shopify App Checkout Hijack (October 2026)
Date: October 10 to 18, 2026; first reported by a developer who landed on a fake checkout page while shopping
Vector: Malicious JavaScript pushed through the settings of three third-party apps (Hulk Product Options, Selleasy and Swym Wishlist Plus), redirecting shoppers to look-alike checkout pages on .top domains
Impact: Card and billing details typed into the fake pages; shoppers then landed on the real checkout, so orders completed; no victim count was published, and all three apps were delisted
This is the newest entry on the list, and it hit the biggest hosted platform.
Over eight days in October 2026, attackers used at least three Shopify apps to send shoppers from real stores to fake checkout pages on look-alike domains. Shoppers typed in their card and billing details, then landed on the store’s real checkout, so the order completed and nothing looked wrong. A developer hit the first fake page on October 10 while shopping and traced it to the Hulk Product Options app. Shopify removed it from that store 16 minutes after escalating the report internally. Selleasy was hit on October 13 and Swym Wishlist Plus on October 14.
The code never touched the store’s theme. It arrived as data from each app vendor’s servers: a custom JavaScript field, a “Custom JS” setting, even the label on an “Add to Wishlist” button. Theme files and app loaders stayed the same, so file comparisons and integrity checks had nothing to flag. The script also fired once per browser session, so a second test could look clean.
Shopify didn’t publish a victim count. On October 20 it told app developers that bad actors are trying to exploit merchants’ trust in apps, and said it is tightening the boundaries for storefront app code.
Merchants didn’t catch it. A developer shopping on one of the stores did. An app you installed can change what your storefront does overnight without changing a single file you own. Reflectiz loads your pages from the outside, the way a shopper’s browser does, so a script that starts sending shoppers to an unknown domain shows up as a change in behavior, whichever app delivered it.
3. TrojanOrder: When the Order Is the Exploit (November 2022)
Date: Adobe issued the fix in February 2022; attacks surged in November 2022
Vector: Orders carrying code, exploiting a critical mail-template flaw in Magento 2 and Adobe Commerce (CVE-2022-24086)
Impact: At least seven Magecart groups injecting TrojanOrders at about 38% of Magento and Adobe Commerce sites in November; at least a third of stores still unpatched
Nine months after the fix, the attack peaked in the weeks before Black Friday.
The name says how it worked. A TrojanOrder is an order built to exploit the flaw, so the attacker’s code arrived as a purchase and ran on the server through the mail-template engine. After a quiet summer, researchers saw more probes of the flaw in November than in the previous ten months combined, from seven different attack vectors.
Cost and timing helped. Exploit kits that cost $20,000 to $30,000 in early 2022 were selling for as little as $2,500 by November, and SecurityWeek reported researchers’ view that cheap kits, a high success rate and the busy October-to-December season all played a part. The groups also fought over stores, trying to take them from each other.
An order form is an input like any other, and here it reached code on the server, so checkout was both the target and the delivery route. It also exposed a patch backlog: a flaw fixed in February was still paying off in November, with at least a third of stores unpatched.
Order data is an attack input, which is where testing a live checkout starts. Basic scanners don’t get past the cart. Agentic web pentesting does: AI agents drive a real browser through your cart, checkout and account flows, feed crafted input into the fields an order touches, and validate each finding before it reaches your report. Security Hub catches the skimmer these attacks ended with.
2. CosmicSting: 5% of Magento Stores Skimmed (June to October 2024)
Date: Disclosed June 11, 2024; mass exploitation from mid-July; documented in early October
Vector: CVE-2024-34102 (CVSS 9.8), a flaw that let attackers steal Magento’s secret cryptographic keys and forge tokens with full API access
Impact: 4,275 stores with a payment skimmer on their checkout page, 5% of all Adobe Commerce and Magento stores; seven groups; victims included Ray-Ban, National Geographic, Cisco, Whirlpool and Segway
Researchers called CosmicSting the worst bug to hit Magento and Adobe Commerce in two years, and the patch gap explains why.
A week after Adobe’s fix, only a quarter of vulnerable stores had installed it, and when automated scanning for the keys began, 75% of the install base was still unpatched. By early October, 4,275 stores carried a skimmer on checkout.
The attack turned a read flaw into full control. Groups used it to pull a store’s secret keys, then generated tokens that gave unrestricted access to the Magento API. Seven groups ran large campaigns, and in some cases three attacked the same store, evicting each other again and again. Unit 42 counts it among the skimming incidents that hit retailers in peak season, with persistent backdoors and checkout skimming scripts going in leading into Black Friday and Cyber Monday.
The fix existed for nearly four months before the count reached 4,275, and patching later doesn’t undo what an attacker already planted or stole. A flaw that only read files became full API control because the keys protecting the platform were reachable, and by the time a skimmer shows up on checkout, the real break-in has already happened on the server.
Security Hub sees injected scripts the moment they change what the checkout page does, and agentic web pentesting tests your exposed API surface the way an attacker probes it. Neither replaces patching.
Read our full breakdown: CosmicSting – Magecart Attacks are Back
1. SessionReaper: A Magento Flaw Exploited in the Run-Up to Black Friday (October to November 2025)
Date: Fix released September 9, 2025; attacks began October 22 and ran through at least November 23
Vector: CVE-2025-54236 (CVSS 9.1), an input-validation flaw in Magento’s REST API that allows customer account takeover and, under certain conditions, unauthenticated remote code execution
Impact: More than 250 exploitation attempts in the first 24 hours, 62% of stores still unpatched six weeks after the fix, and a listing in CISA’s known-exploited catalog on October 24
We’re closing on this one because it shows the whole cycle in six weeks.
Adobe shipped an emergency fix on September 9. Ten days later, only one in three stores had installed it. On October 22 a technical analysis of the flaw was published and the first attacks followed: more than 250 exploitation attempts in 24 hours, mostly from five IP addresses, with payloads that were PHP webshells and phpinfo probes.
Then it accelerated. Adobe confirmed that the flaw was being exploited in the wild, and CISA added it to its known-exploited catalog on October 24, two days after the first attacks. CrowdSec saw sustained activity through November 23, five days before Black Friday.
Patching late didn’t make a store safe. The payloads were webshells and other backdoors, and an attacker who got in before the patch can keep access after it.
The six weeks between the fix and the first attack were the window, and most stores didn’t use it: 62% were still unpatched. The risk date isn’t the patch date, it’s the day exploit details go public. A customer account takeover also means the attacker can act as your shoppers, not only as your server.
Reflectiz can’t patch a server-side flaw, and our own breakdown says so. What it does is detect the attacks SessionReaper enables downstream, such as credential theft, session hijacking and skimming, by watching every outbound request from your pages in real time. Agentic web pentesting covers the other side: AI agents test your storefront’s externally reachable endpoints, including the account and session paths SessionReaper abused, and rerun on every release, so the first test of a new flaw isn’t the attacker’s.
Read our full breakdown: SessionReaper Hits Magento: Here’s How To Protect Your Store
Why These Attacks Changed the Conversation
Online stores rarely lose to a technique nobody has seen. They lose to a flaw that already has a patch, a platform version nobody upgraded or an app nobody was watching, in the weeks when the store earns the most and the team is least willing to change anything.
Three of these five used flaws that already had a public fix. For the other two, ZAGG and the Shopify app hijack, how the attackers got in hasn’t been published. In every case, the damage came through something the store had already decided to trust or hadn’t updated.
The patch gaps are the story. At least a third of stores were still unpatched nine months after TrojanOrder’s fix. Only a quarter had patched a week after CosmicSting’s, and 62% were still unpatched six weeks after SessionReaper’s. Each led to mass, automated exploitation. This season, StyleSmuggler skipped the gap entirely: it was exploited three days before a fix existed.
The pace keeps rising. On October 20, Shopify told its app developers that attacks across its app ecosystem are increasing as AI gets better at finding vulnerabilities. Attackers probe your store every day. An annual pentest checks it once. Agentic web pentesting runs on every release, with AI agents testing your store the way an attacker would.
Then the payload lands where server-side tools don’t look. The skimmer sits in the shopper’s browser on the checkout page, and in the ZAGG and Shopify cases the whole attack lived there, found by a platform provider or by a shopper rather than by the store. Patching still matters, and so does testing before the code freeze. But a fix on the platform doesn’t tell you whether you were already hit, whether an app changed last night or whether the checkout is behaving today.
The only way to catch that moment is to test what’s exposed the way the attacker will, and to watch what your scripts are actually doing right now.
The age of chasing hackers is over. The real risk lives in your exposure.
How to Prepare Your Store Before Black Friday
Five controls, one for each attack on this list.
Do them before your code freeze, because that’s when changing anything gets harder.
- Treat the day exploit details go public as the deadline. Install emergency fixes within days, not the vendor’s 30-day window, and check that the fix actually applied. (#1, SessionReaper)
- If you ran an unpatched version, assume secrets leaked. Rotate the platform’s secret keys and API tokens, reset admin passwords and remove API integrations you don’t recognize. (#2, CosmicSting)
- Test every input that touches checkout for injection. Include order data and any field that feeds an email template, and repeat the test on every release. (#3, TrojanOrder)
- Monitor your storefront and checkout continuously instead of waiting to be told. The Shopify fake checkouts were found by a developer shopping on an affected store, not by the merchants, and file checks never fired because no file changed. (#4, the Shopify app hijack)
- Inventory and monitor every script and app on the payment page. Require a written justification for each one and alert on change, which is what PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 ask for. (#5, ZAGG)
Reflectiz can’t patch or upgrade your platform, but it covers the testing and monitoring side from the outside in, with no code on your site.
Reflectiz agentic web pentesting sends AI agents through your storefront the way an attacker would: in a real browser, through logins, one-time passcodes and 2FA, into the checkout and account flows that basic scanners never reach. A separate agent validates each finding, and every run leaves a coverage record. The agents start with context from more than 100,000 websites Reflectiz has scanned, so they don’t start from zero. Run it before the code freeze, inside the scope and off-peak windows you set, and again on every release after it.
Security Hub monitors every script and third party on your pages, and the PCI Module produces the evidence for 6.4.3 and 11.6.1.
Want the full testing playbook? Read our guide to website pentesting for e-commerce. Working on the compliance side? See PCI DSS v4.0: How To Comply Before Black Friday.
Sources
- StyleSmuggler: Magento and Adobe Commerce 0-day RCE (CVE-2026-75650) under active attack (Sansec)
- Shopify shops hit with ongoing Checkout Hijack attack (Roman Zipp)
- Securing your app, together (Shopify)
- Hackers hijack Convertr analytics script to steal payment card data (BleepingComputer)
- SessionReaper attacks have started, 3 in 5 stores still vulnerable (Sansec)
- CVE-2025-54236: SessionReaper Exploit Hits 130K+ Magento Stores in Massive Hijacking Wave (CrowdSec)
- Security bulletin APSB25-88 for Adobe Commerce (Adobe)
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CISA)
- Thousands of Adobe Commerce stores hacked in competing CosmicSting campaigns (Sansec)
- CosmicSting attack threatens 75% of Adobe Commerce stores (Sansec)
- Unwrapping Retail Peak Season Cyber Threats (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42)
- Adobe Commerce merchants to be hit with TrojanOrders this season (Sansec)
- Magento Vulnerability Increasingly Exploited to Hack Online Stores (SecurityWeek)
- Magento stores targeted in massive surge of TrojanOrders attacks (BleepingComputer)
- ZAGG disclosed a data breach that exposed its customers’ credit card data (Security Affairs)
FAQs
Why do attackers target online stores around Black Friday?
Store traffic and transactions peak, so a skimmer harvests more cards, and retail security teams are often under code freezes that limit what they can change, as Unit 42 notes. Researchers also pointed to cheap exploit kits and the success of earlier attacks as reasons for the November 2022 surge.
What was the biggest attack on online stores during a Black Friday season?
Reflectiz ranks SessionReaper (2025) first: it was exploited six weeks after the fix, with 62% of stores still unpatched, and CISA listed it as known-exploited two days after the first attacks. By confirmed compromises, CosmicSting (2024) is the largest documented, with 4,275 stores carrying a skimmer on checkout.
Which attacks have hit online stores in 2026?
In September 2026, attackers exploited StyleSmuggler, a CVSS 10 Magento and Adobe Commerce flaw, three days before Adobe had a fix. In October, three Shopify apps were hijacked to send shoppers to fake checkout pages, and a skimmer ran on every merchant’s checkout on Convertr, a Brazilian ecommerce platform, after attackers altered its analytics script.
Did any of these attacks happen on Black Friday itself?
None of the five is documented hitting on the day. ZAGG’s skimmer ran from October 26 to November 7, 2024, SessionReaper activity continued through at least November 23, 2025, five days before Black Friday, and the Shopify app hijack ran from October 10 to 18, 2026.
Are Shopify and BigCommerce stores affected by these attacks?
Yes. Three of the five hit self-hosted Magento and Adobe Commerce stores. The other two hit hosted platforms through third-party apps: ZAGG through FreshClick on BigCommerce in 2024, and Shopify stores through three hijacked apps in October 2026. BigCommerce said its own systems weren’t breached, and no report says Shopify’s own checkout was. The apps on the storefront were the way in, which is why hosted stores aren’t immune.
What is a payment skimmer?
A skimmer, or Magecart-style attack, is malicious JavaScript or malware on a checkout page that copies card details as shoppers type them and sends them to the attacker. In these cases it arrived through a platform flaw (CosmicSting, TrojanOrder) or through a compromised third-party app (ZAGG). The 2026 Shopify app hijack used a variation: instead of copying card details on the real page, it sent shoppers to a fake checkout that collected them.
Does patching fix a store that was already compromised?
No. Patching closes the hole but doesn’t remove what is already planted. If a store was exposed, scan for backdoors, rotate secret keys and API tokens, reset admin passwords and remove integrations you don’t recognize.
What is agentic web pentesting?
Agentic web pentesting is penetration testing of a website by autonomous AI agents. They drive a real browser the way an attacker would: they log in, get through one-time passcodes and 2FA, work through multi-step flows such as checkout and account recovery, and try to exploit what they find, while a human sets the scope and reviews the results. Unlike a manual pentest, it can run on every release.
How can agentic web pentesting help before Black Friday?
It tests your live checkout, login and APIs for the classes of flaw behind these attacks, such as injection through order data, session and account weaknesses and exposed API endpoints, and shows what an attacker could reach. Reflectiz agentic web pentesting drives a real browser through logins, one-time passcodes and 2FA, validates each finding and repeats on every release, so you can retest after each change before the code freeze. It doesn’t replace patching or monitoring.
What do PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 require for checkout pages?
Requirement 6.4.3 calls for an inventory of every script on payment pages, with authorization and a written justification for each. Requirement 11.6.1 calls for alerts on unauthorized changes to those scripts and to the page’s HTTP headers. Both apply to any app running on a payment page, like the one compromised at ZAGG.
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