In late January 2022, Okta detected an attempt to compromise the account of a third party customer support engineer working for one of our subprocessors. The matter was investigated and contained by the subprocessor. (1 of 2)
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Hey Todd! I'm sorry you're having a very nerve wracking night. Can you elaborate more on how you reached this conclusion? 1/8 of the screenshots demonstrates access to an internal Okta Slack account, and another one shows PII from
@Cloudflare. Isn't this a breach for CF's PII? -
I suppose the answer isn't something that fits in a tweet, perhaps. Is there maybe a timeline on a postmortem? Early containment is great if it happened, but without enough context to call off full scale investigations from every org, this is a hair-on-fire event for IR teams.
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When will there be an official communication come out to your customers?
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And their shareholders?
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You guys are using log4j as well as Palo Alto (Globalprotect) which has an RCE running with an exploit since January 2021; Tell
@RandoriSecurity thanks :-)https://twitter.com/HaboubiAnis/status/1506180610460639236?s=20&t=bR6Y0Fao67Y2XniIXvFxrg …
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Palo was patched unless I’m missing something
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Believing implies you have faith, not confidence
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You can’t prove a negative, so if no evidence points to the positive what are you left with?
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Did you notify the customers that were accessed in this way?
Thanks. Twitter will use this to make your timeline better. UndoUndo
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Did Okta notify its customers of this breach at the time it happened?
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The perfect question.
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